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Abstract: 
SARS-CoV-2 has caused a severe, ongoing outbreak of COVID-19 in Massachusetts with            
111,070 confirmed cases and 8,433 deaths as of August 1, 2020. To investigate the              
introduction, spread, and epidemiology of COVID-19 in the Boston area, we sequenced and             
analyzed 772 complete SARS-CoV-2 genomes from the region, including nearly all confirmed            
cases within the first week of the epidemic and hundreds of cases from major outbreaks at a                 
conference, a nursing facility, and among homeless shelter guests and staff. The data reveal              
over 80 introductions into the Boston area, predominantly from elsewhere in the United States              
and Europe. We studied two superspreading events covered by the data, events that led to very                
different outcomes because of the timing and populations involved. One produced rapid spread             
in a vulnerable population but little onward transmission, while the other was a major contributor               
to sustained community transmission, including outbreaks in homeless populations, and was           
exported to several other domestic and international sites. The same two events differed             
significantly in the number of new mutations seen, raising the possibility that SARS-CoV-2             
superspreading might encompass disparate transmission dynamics. Our results highlight the          
failure of measures to prevent importation into MA early in the outbreak, underscore the role of                
superspreading in amplifying an outbreak in a major urban area, and lay a foundation for               
contact tracing informed by genetic data.  
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Main Text 
SARS-CoV-2 has now caused over 22 million infections and over 775,000 deaths worldwide ​(​1​)              
in one of the worst public health crises of the past century. ​The early impact of the COVID-19                  
pandemic has been particularly severe in the state of Massachusetts (MA) in the northeastern              
United States (US). The first case in the state was ​confirmed on February 1, 2020 ​(​2​)​; case                 
counts rapidly accelerated beginning in March and peaked in the third week in April ​. The Boston                
area, home to 70% of the population of MA, accounted for 79% of COVID-19 cases and 76% of                  
COVID-19 deaths in the state to this point ​(​3​)​. ​COVID-19 has disproportionately affected             
vulnerable populations, particularly residents and staff in congregate living environments ​(​4​) and            
racial and ethnic minorities ​(​5​, ​6​)​. In MA, residents and healthcare workers in long-term care               
facilities accounted for 22% of all confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 64% of all reported deaths                
through August 1, 2020 ​(​7​)​. 
 
COVID-19, like previous coronavirus outbreaks ​(​8​, ​9​)​, has been marked by the prominence of              
superspreading events ​(​10​, ​11​)​, in which one individual infects an unusually large number of              
secondary cases. (For this study, we define a superspreading event as the transmission of at               
least 8 secondary infections from a single source, corresponding to the 99th percentile ​(​12​) for               
an R​eff of 2.5.) More broadly, a great deal of SARS-CoV-2 transmission has occurred in clusters                
of cases linked to events and gatherings, including on cruise ships ​(​13​)​, in churches ​(​14​)​, and                
especially in congregate settings such as care homes ​(​15​)​, homeless shelters ​(​16​)​, and prisons              
(​17​)​. However, the evidence indicating that these events drive transmission has been based             
largely on time-series data showing an increase in cases following them ​(​18​)​. Case counts              
alone have little ability to determine the contribution of any event to overall transmission or to                
3 
 . CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)
The copyright holder for this preprint this version posted August 25, 2020. .https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.08.23.20178236doi: medRxiv preprint 
 
distinguish superspreading from other forms of locally intense transmission. Yet understanding           
how the virus is actually spreading is critical for prioritizing public health interventions:             
cluster-based spread may be controlled with more limited restrictions than the population            
measures required to curb community-based transmission. Genomic data can reveal          
connections between cases that cannot be detected through conventional epidemiology alone,           
including direct evidence of superspreading based on shared viral sequences. To gain insight             
into the introduction and spread of SARS-CoV-2, and to examine the role of putative              
transmission linked to events and gatherings, we conducted a detailed genomic epidemiology            
study of the Boston area epidemic.  
Genomic Analysis of SARS-CoV-2 from the Boston Area 
We performed viral genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of SARS-CoV-2-positive          
nasopharyngeal (NP) samples collected by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health           
(MADPH) between January 29, 2020, and April 18, 2020, and by the Massachusetts General              
Hospital (MGH) between March 4, 2020, and May 9, 2020. Our dataset includes nearly all               
confirmed early cases of the epidemic in MA through March 8, 2020 (Fig. 1A-B); samples from                
many of the highest-prevalence communities in and around Boston across the first wave (Fig.              
1C), including Chelsea, Revere, and Everett (Fig. 1D-F, Fig. S1); and samples from putative              
superspreading events involving an international conference and congregate living         
environments, specifically among homeless shelter guests and staff and within a skilled nursing             
facility.  
 
Viral genomes were sequenced using Illumina-based unbiased metagenomic short-read         
sequencing, followed by reference-guided assembly using viral-ngs 2.0.21 software ​(​19​) with           
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the Wuhan-Hu-1 sequence (NC_045512.2) as the reference (Materials and Methods). We           
generated 778 high-quality SARS-CoV-2 assemblies (>98% complete) from 772 individuals, and           
an additional 72 high-quality partial genomes (>80% complete) (Fig. 1A). Genome recovery and             
coverage were strongly correlated with viral abundance and clinical diagnostic test results (Fig.             
S2 and S3). Genomes were separated from one another by a median of 6 single nucleotide                
polymorphisms (SNPs) (interquartile range 4-9 SNPs; range 0-85 SNPs) (Fig. S4A-B). As            
expected during rapid population expansion, most alleles were rare, as assessed by a strongly              
negative Tajima’s D statistic throughout the genome (Fig. S4C).  
  
We constructed a phylogenetic tree from this dataset in the context of a global set of 4,011                 
high-quality genomes (Fig. 2A) drawn from the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data              
(GISAID) (Materials and Methods). Root-to-tip regression showed a clear, albeit noisy, temporal            
signal in our dataset, with the fitted regression model accounting for 17% of the variance in the                 
root-to-tip distance (Fig. S5). The presence of a temporal signal means that a molecular clock               
can be fitted to infer the timing of ancestral branching based on SARS-CoV-2 genomes. These               
trees form the basis of our analysis of the Boston area epidemic.  
Introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into Massachusetts 
We identified putative introductions into MA through phylogenetic analysis using an ancestral            
inference model (Materials and Methods). Most introductions of SARS-CoV-2 into MA occurred            
early in the pandemic, in March and early April, primarily from elsewhere in North America and                
from Europe (Table 1, Fig. 2D, and Fig. S6). We observed close connectivity between genome               
sequences from MA and genome sequences from elsewhere in the Northeastern USA, in             
particular New York (Fig. 2A). Close interstate connectivity is consistent with frequent domestic             
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travel, which continued even after international routes were closed. The fraction of cases that              
were imported decreased over time (Fig. 2D), with the steepest decline during March (Fig. S6).               
By April 2020, the vast majority of cases resulted from local transmission rather than importation               
(Table 1, Fig. 2D, and Fig. S6). In total, we identified more than 80 likely introductions into MA                  
through May 9, representing sources on four continents (Table 1).  
Early diagnosed cases in MA cluster in a way consistent with their known travel and exposure                
history. This includes the first known COVID-19 case in MA, a traveler returning from Wuhan,               
China (2)​. Phylogenetic analysis of SARS-CoV-2 isolated from this case (named MA-1 by the              
CDC), based on a sample collected January 29, 2020, revealed that it clustered with others               
from China (Fig. S7), confirming its likely origin. Similarly, the viral sequence of the second               
known MA case (MA_DPH_00002), collected on March 3 from a patient who had recently              
traveled to Italy and Switzerland (21) clustered with European sequences (Fig. S8) and is              
descended from the SARS-CoV-2 genome seen in a third MA case (MA_DPH_00003), a patient              
who had been on the same trip. No other viral genomes in our dataset appeared to descend                 
from these 3 cases. Thus, quarantine and contact tracing efforts appear to have prevented              
spread from the first known introductions into MA.  
We also investigated the first cases of community transmission in MA, which occurred in              
Berkshire County and included several patients who had attended the same public event.             
Analysis of 5 viral genomes (1 complete and 4 partial) from these cases indicated that the                
cluster involved at least 2 introductions (Fig. S9). Four of the genomes had the same consensus                
sequence, indicating a common source, most likely within the United States (Fig. S10); based              
on the presence of the C17747T variant (i.e. a T instead of a C at position 17747), it was                   
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probably from the West Coast. We are unable to assess subsequent community transmission in              
Western MA since our data does not include any later Western MA samples. 
Investigation of Superspreading Events 
Spread of SARS-CoV-2 in an International Business Conference 
The first large cluster of cases in MA was recognized in the context of an international business                 
conference held in Boston from February 26 - 27 (​18​)​. Ultimately, more than 90 cases were                
diagnosed in people associated with this conference or their contacts (​22​)​, raising suspicion that              
a superspreading event had occurred there. Our dataset contains SARS-CoV-2 genomes from            
28 of these cases, allowing us to look for genetic evidence of superspreading. Genetic evidence               
of superspreading would take the form of phylogenetic clustering of identical or highly similar              
viruses occurring in a narrow time window.  
  
The signature of superspreading can indeed be seen in the conference-associated cases. All 28              
genomes form a well-supported monophyletic cluster (Fig. 3A, Fig. S11) marked by the             
presence of the SNP C2416T (Fig. 2B-C). The parent lineage of C2416T is defined by               
G25563T, a lineage that was widely distributed in Europe in January and February 2020. ​The               
estimated time to the most recent common ancestor (tMRCA) for C2416T-containing genomes            
is February 14 (95% highest posterior density (HPD) February 4 - February 20). The C2416T               
variant first appears in the GISAID database in 2 French patients, ages 87 and 88, on February                 
29, 2020, and is absent from the 1,312 genomes in the database sampled prior to February 29                 
(Fig. 2C). In our dataset, all 27 C2416T-containing viruses collected prior to March 10 ​th were               
sampled from individuals with conference exposure, consistent with publicly available CDC           
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genome data from MA cases from January 29 through March 7 (​24​)​. The rarity of C2416T in                 
February (Fig. 2C) makes additional introductions of this allele unlikely. Taken together, this             
strongly suggests there was low-level community transmission of C2416T in Europe in February             
2020 before the allele was introduced to Boston via a single introduction and amplified by               
superspreading at the conference. 
  
SARS-CoV-2 containing the C2416T allele subsequently spread extensively in the Boston area,            
representing 261/744 or 35.1% of our dataset (exclusive of known-conference associated           
genomes) (Fig 2B, see ​Sustained Local Transmission below). Beginning in early March,            
C2416T also appeared in multiple other US states and other countries (Fig. 2A) and increased               
steeply in frequency, comprising 319/11,938 (2.7%) of domestic and 937/56,118 (1.7%) of            
global SARS-CoV-2 genomes in GISAID collected through June 28 (Fig. 2C). The            
superspreading event appears to have contributed to this rise in frequency, as observed in two               
ways. Firstly, we identified a second variant (G26233T) that shows strong evidence of emerging              
during or immediately after the conference as it was first seen in 7 of 28 individuals with known                  
exposure to the conference, including in one sample from a conference attendee at intermediate              
frequency (26%). C2416T/G26233T was subsequently exported from Boston to several US           
states, including Virginia, North Carolina, and Texas, and to other countries, including Australia,             
Sweden, and Slovakia (Fig. 2A, Fig. S12A-B), with evidence of community spread in Virginia,              
Australia, and Michigan. Secondly, we assessed the extent to which US spread of C2416T              
could be due to additional importations from Europe. Two European sub-lineages           
(C2416T/G8371T and C2416T/G20578T) are extremely rare in the United States: 0/73           
genomes and 1/228 genomes, respectively, compared with 24/197 genomes containing the           
C2416T/G26233T mutations (Fig. S12C-D). This, along with epidemiological data connecting          
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multiple conference-linked cases to other US states (​25​– ​28​)​, suggests that most C2416T            
viruses in the US likely derive from this initial introduction. However, we cannot estimate the               
absolute number of individuals involved as sequenced genomes are not a random sample of              
cases and US state-level data is highly incomplete at this time. 
 
Spread of SARS-CoV-2 In Homeless Shelter Guests and Staff 
To support public health investigations of transmission in high priority populations, we analyzed             
the introduction and spread of SARS-CoV-2 in homeless shelter guests and staff served by the               
Boston Health Care for the Homeless Program (BHCHP). Samples were collected in March and              
April 2020 and included those collected during universal screening at Boston’s largest homeless             
shelter​(​16​)​. From these samples, we assembled and inferred a phylogeny from 193            
SARS-CoV-2 genomes (Fig. 2A, Fig. 3A and Fig. 3B). We identified at least 7 introductions into                
the BHCHP population, including 4 that resulted in clusters containing 20 or more highly similar               
viral genomes (Fig. 4A and Fig. 4C); a phylogenetic signature consistent with superspreading.             
Two of the clusters were of genomes descended from the C2416T lineage: ​of the 193 genomes,                
105 (54.4%) contained C2416T, and 54 of these 105 (51.4%) additionally contained G26233T,             
demonstrating that BHCHP guests and staff were affected by community transmission resulting            
from conference-associated amplification and spread of SARS-CoV-2. 
 
Spread of SARS-CoV-2 In a Skilled Nursing Facility  
We also investigated cases in another vulnerable population, cases that were involved in a              
superspreading event at a skilled nursing facility (SNF) in the Boston area. Prior to a planned                
relocation of residents in early April, universal screening detected SARS-CoV-2 in 82/97 (85%)             
of the residents and 36/97 (37%) of the staff by RT-qPCR ​(​29​)​. We assembled 83 SARS-CoV-2                
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genomes from these individuals, 75 of which comprised a single cluster of closely related              
genomes (59 identical), all containing a G3892T mutation (posterior support of 1 in maximum              
clade credibility tree, Fig. 3A and Fig. 3B). The paucity of genetic variation within the cluster                
implies that introduction into the facility had been recent and from a single predominant source               
(Fig. 4A). Consistent with this, the median tMRCA for sequences in the cluster was March 20                
(Fig. 3C, 95 % HPD: March 13 - March 24, 2020). The estimated tMRCA along with the high                  
proportion (30/45) of residents who tested negative on April 1, 2020, but were found to be                
positive 5 days later ​(​29​) suggests rapid spread within the facility in late March and early April                 
2020.  
 
The genetic diversity in the SNF cluster is strikingly low even under the assumption of recent                
transmission from a single source. The 18 mutations seen in the cluster is significantly lower               
than what we would expect based on the conference cluster (p = 0.019), which occurred over a                 
similarly short time window, and much lower than the 30 mutations expected under a simple               
model of SARS-CoV-2 substitution (p = 0.011, Materials and Methods). The low genetic             
diversity in this cluster might simply result from low diversity in the index patient, but could also                 
reflect differences in the transmission process at work. For example, if more virions than usual               
were transmitted to each SNF case, then the resulting infections would more often have the               
same consensus genome as the index case.  
 
In addition to the major SNF cluster, two other introductions, each containing three genomes,              
can also be seen among the patients and staff in the SNF (Fig. 3A and Fig. 4B). There is strong                    
phylogenetic support for each of these two separate introductions (Fig 3A). The observation that              
one introduction led to massive spread, while the other two did not, is consistent with reported                
10 
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overdispersion of secondary infections in several coronaviruses ​(​8​, ​12​, ​30​, ​31​)​; that is, there is               
more variance in the number of secondary infections caused by each case than expected from               
a random Poisson process. Although one clade predominated within this SNF, the occurrence             
of at least three independent introductions underscores the high risk of introduction into a single               
facility ​(​32​)​. These introductions occurred despite strict infection control policies—including a           
restriction on visitors ​(​33​)​, universal masking for all staff, masking for all residents when leaving               
their rooms, and vigilance with hand hygiene—in place for at least two weeks before the first                
detected infection ​(​29​)​. 
Investigation of potential nosocomial outbreaks 
We investigated two case clusters at MGH for which the Infection Control Unit raised suspicions               
of a nosocomial outbreak. In the first cluster, two patients in the same hospital ward tested                
positive for SARS-CoV-2 during their hospital stay after testing negative at the time of              
admission. In the second cluster, five patients who received care in a speciality ward were               
diagnosed with SARS-CoV-2 infections over a period of several days. For each cluster,             
complete genomes (2 of 2 from the first cluster and 4 of 5 from the second cluster) were                  
inconsistent with a common ancestor during the period of hospitalization (Fig. S13). We             
therefore rejected the hypothesis that the individuals in each cluster were part of the same               
transmission chain, although we cannot exclude the possibility of nosocomial transmission ​per            
se because independent introductions from multiple asymptomatic staff could theoretically have           
occurred.  
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Sustained Local Transmission 
Our dataset covers March 3 through May 9, an interval that spans the beginning, peak, and                
initial decline of the first wave of the epidemic in MA (Fig. 1C). Several clades established early                 
in the Boston-area outbreak showed continued community transmission throughout that period           
(Table 2, Fig. 3A-B), with the lineage containing C2416T, associated with the conference, being              
the largest. The C2416T lineage was likely the first of these clades imported into Boston               
(median estimated tMRCA, February 14, 2020; 95% HPD February 4 - 20, 2020) (Fig. 3C). The                
other four major lineages (G3892T, G105T, G28899T, and C20099T) appeared to enter the             
region between March and early April 2020. Consistent with a larger global trend ​(​34​, ​35​)​, we                
observed a rise in frequency of viruses harboring the D614G amino acid polymorphism,             
conferred by a SNP at nucleotide 23,403 in the Wuhan reference strain, which rose to               
near-fixation in MA by the end of the study period (Fig. 2B) and is present in all of the dominant                    
lineages. 
 
Based on tMRCA estimates for major Boston-area clades, we do not find evidence of              
undetected, or “cryptic,” transmission before mid-February, although small outbreaks may have           
gone undetected. In addition to the lineages reported here, none of the importation events we               
inferred (Table 1) occurred prior to known cases, although testing for SARS-CoV-2 in MA was               
restricted to a narrow definition prior to established community spread ​(​36​)​. In particular,             
additional isolated events similar to the MA-1 importation may have occurred and escaped             
detection with the current resolution of sampling. 
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Phylogenetic data, when labeled by patient zip code (Fig. S14), reveal that all major lineages,               
including conference-associated viruses, were circulating in the Boston-area communities of          
Chelsea, Revere, and Everett, which were among the most heavily affected communities in the              
state (Fig. 1D). Thus, while viral lineages entered and were amplified by distinct mechanisms,              
cases rapidly spread between communities (Fig. S15). C2416T was the most common lineage             
in the Boston area throughout the study period and across sampling sites (Fig. S16). By the end                 
of that period, the cumulative allele frequency of C2416T in our dataset, exclusive of              
conference- and SNF-associated samples, was 46.4% (194/418) in Suffolk, 30.1% (31/103) in            
Middlesex, 30.0% in Essex (12/40), and 40.9% (9/22) in Norfolk counties. The conference             
superspreading event likely had an outsized effect because it occurred early in the pandemic              
(Fig. S17). Extensive spread within the Boston area likely then contributed to the rise in               
frequency of C2416T and C26233T in the United States and worldwide (Fig. 2B-C).  
 
Respiratory Viral Coinfections 
The metagenomic approach we used for sequencing SARS-CoV-2 enabled us to screen for             
respiratory viral co-infections in patients with COVID-19. We found other respiratory viruses in             
20/1431 (1.4%) of COVID-19 cases (Fig. 4D) and confirmed these results using the BioFire              
FilmArray Respiratory Panel (Fig. S18). The most common co-infecting viruses were           
Rhinovirus/Enterovirus. The rarity of co-infections (lower than reported in an early dataset from             
California ​(​37​)​) likely reflects the timing of the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic in MA, which began near               
the end of the influenza season; weekly data from MADPH show rapidly declining influenza              
activity in March and April 2020 ​(​38​)​. We observed a higher rate of co-infection with other                
respiratory pathogens among BHCHP clients and staff (12/314) than in the other samples in our               
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dataset (8/1117) (p = 0.0002, Fisher’s exact test), consistent with an increased epidemiological             
risk in this population. 
Conclusions 
We present here an analysis of SARS-CoV-2 genomic epidemiology primarily in the Boston             
area, which was severely affected early in the US COVID-19 epidemic. Through dense             
sampling of the early phase of the epidemic we show the frequency of importation events—over               
80 independent introductions—and the impact of early superspreading events in driving           
amplification and community transmission, likely accelerating the transition from containment to           
mitigation strategies.  
 
Besides better understanding of outbreak dynamics, viral sequencing and phylogenetic analysis           
can also provide immediately actionable insights. In the current study, we were able to rule out                
linked nosocomial spread in two episodes, reassuring hospital management that a failure of             
infection control practice in these wards had not led to a nosocomial cluster, and showed that                
despite multiple introductions of SARS-CoV-2 into a SNF, one introduction was responsible for             
90% of cases. Real-time genomic epidemiology may be increasingly valuable as schools and             
workplaces navigate the challenges of reopening, as it can help distinguish between local             
outbreaks within institutions and introductions from outside.  
 
The relatively narrow surveillance definition for SARS-CoV-2 in MA until March 4 may have              
limited identification of other early introductions or delayed detection of some individuals who             
did not meet testing criteria. Similarly, the dataset is not a random sample over time, comprised                
instead largely of cases that fell in the MGH catchment area or that were sampled from                
particular subpopulations to gain insight into local epidemiology.  
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Our findings repeatedly highlight the close relationships between seemingly disconnected          
groups and populations: viruses from international business travel seeded major outbreaks           
among individuals experiencing homelessness, spread throughout the Boston area, and were           
exported to other domestic and international sites. It also illustrates the role of chance in the                
trajectory of an epidemic: a single introduction had an outsize effect on subsequent             
transmission because it was unfortunately amplified by superspreading in a highly mobile            
population very early in the outbreak, before many precautions were put in place and when its                
effects would be further amplified by exponential growth. By contrast, other early introductions             
led to very little onward transmission, and another superspreading event in a SNF, while              
devastating to the residents, had little large-scale effect because it occurred later and in a more                
isolated population. This study provides direct evidence that superspreading events may           
profoundly alter the course of an epidemic and implies that prevention, detection, and mitigation              
of such events should be a priority for public health efforts.  
 
Acknowledgements: 
We gratefully acknowledge the microbiology lab staff at MGH and DPH and all members of the                
COVID-19 emergency response efforts at MGH, BHCHP, and MADPH. We also thank Hayden             
C. Metsky for valuable feedback. 
Funding: This work was sponsored by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases              
(U19AI110818 to P.C.S; R37AI147868 to J.L.), the National Human Genome Research Institute            
(K99HG010669 to S.K.R.), the National Institute of General Medical Sciences of the National             
15 
 . CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)
The copyright holder for this preprint this version posted August 25, 2020. .https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.08.23.20178236doi: medRxiv preprint 
 
Institutes of Health (U54GM088558 W.P.H.), ​the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention            
(U01CK000490; MGH), the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Broad Institute), and the US             
Food and Drug Administration (HHSF223201810172C), with in-kind support from Illumina, Inc.,           
as well as support from the Doris Duke Charitable Foundation (J.E.L.), the Howard Hughes              
Medical Institute (P.C.S.), the Herchel Smith Fellowship (K.A.L.), and the Evergrande COVID-19            
Response Fund Award from the Massachusetts Consortium on Pathogen Readiness (J.L). The            
content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official               




Competing interests: ​J.E.L. has received consulting fees from Sherlock Biosciences. J.B. has            
been a consultant for T2 Biosystems, DiaSorin, and Roche Diagnostics. A.P. is a Venture              
Partner at Google Ventures. P.C.S. is a co-founder and shareholder of Sherlock Biosciences,             
and a Board member and shareholder of Danaher Corporation. 
Data and materials availability: ​Sequences and genome assembly data are publicly available            
in the Broad Institute’s ​Terra platform in a ​featured workspace for COVID-19 ​. Researchers can              
use this workspace to reproduce analyses described here or perform similar analyses on their              
own viral sequence data. Assembled genomes and raw metagenomic reads from this dataset             
have been deposited at NCBI’s Genbank and SRA databases under BioProject PRJNA622837            
in accordance with ​NIAID’s Data Sharing policy and will soon be available to visualize on               
nextstrain.org/ncov​. Experimental protocols are publicly available on Benchling and can be           
accessed here:  
16 
 . CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)





List of Supplementary Materials 
Materials and Methods 
Table S1 – S3 
Fig S1 – S18 
References (1 – 54)  
17 
 . CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)
The copyright holder for this preprint this version posted August 25, 2020. .https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.08.23.20178236doi: medRxiv preprint 
 
 
Figures & Tables 
  
18 
 . CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)




Fig 1. Epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 in Massachusetts and of sequenced viral genomes.            
A. ​Cumulative confirmed and presumed cases reported state-wide in MA ​(​7​) from March 1              
through May 1, 2020, and the number of these cases that were processed (orange) and               
successfully yielded complete genomes with >98% coverage (green) in this study. ​B.            
Cumulative proportion of all MA confirmed positive cases with complete genome sequences            
from unique individuals that are part of this dataset over time. ​C. Daily reported cases across                
MA from March 1 through June 15 statewide (blue) and at MGH (orange). ​D. Total number of                 
cases compared to cases per 100,000 people for cities across MA. Cities in blue are highly                
represented in the genome dataset. ​E. Distribution of MA cases with sequenced viral genomes              
by county. ​F. As in E but showing only Middlesex and Suffolk counties, the two counties with the                  
highest number of sequenced samples, by zip code. Cases associated with congregate living             
environments were excluded from the maps in E and F.  
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Fig 2. A. ​Time tree of 772 MA genomes and a global set of 4,011 high-quality genomes from                  
GISAID. The embedded panel shows the C2416T clade in detail (outlined in gray on the main                
tree). To view an interactive version of this tree and for more information on specific               
sub-groupings within the MA dataset see auspice.broadinstitute.org. ​B​. Estimated allele          
frequency in sequenced genomes over time for major Boston-area lineages. ​C​. Frequency of             
the C2416T allele in 58,043 GISAID samples reported through July 14, 2020. ​D​. Proportion of               
genomes that were inferred as imported (ancestral state as not from MA) in the early (prior to                 
March 28, 2020), middle (March 28 - April 14, 2020) and late (after April 15, 2020) time periods                  
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Fig 3. A. ​Time-measured maximum-likelihood phylogeny of 772 MA genomes. ​B. Maximum            
clade credibility tree with tips labeled by clade. Nodes with posterior support > 0.8 are labeled.                
C.​ Violin plots of tMRCA for the major Boston-area clades.  
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Fig 4. SARS-CoV-2 superspreading events. ​A. Haplotype network of SARS-CoV-2          
haplotypes in the MA dataset with major known superspreading events highlighted. ​B, C. Gene              
graphs showing clusters of highly similar sequences among viral genomes from the SNF ​(B)              
and BHCHP ​(C) cohorts. Sequences are clustered when they are separated by < 4 SNPs, and                
the lengths of lines between points reflect genetic distance. ​D. Detection of common respiratory              
viruses from metagenomic sequencing data. Samples with >10 reads mapped to at least 1 of               
these viruses using Kraken2 are shown in red. Enterovirus and Rhinovirus species have been              
grouped due to difficulty in discriminating at the sequence level. 
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Table 1 ​. Ancestral trait inference. Results of discrete trait inference using a binary model (MA vs                
non-MA) and regional model (regional geographic categories) are shown, divided into date            
ranges representing the early, middle, and late period of the first wave of the MA epidemic.   
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Table 2: ​ Major Boston-area lineages identified by lineage-defining mutation.  
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Sample collections 
This study was approved by the Partners Institutional Review Board under protocol 
2019P003305 and MDPH IRB 00000701. ​We obtained samples and selected metadata from 
the MGH Microbiology Laboratory and MADPH under a waiver of consent for viral genomic 
sequencing. Samples were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by RT-qPCR. Samples that tested positive 
were eligible to be included. 
 
Archived samples obtained from the MGH Microbiology Laboratory included nasopharyngeal 
(NP) swabs from five sources 1) all available cases prior to March 8, 2020, 2) all available 
samples from a skilled nursing facility in the Boston area ​(​29​)​, 3) samples from April 1 through 
April 14 from the MGH Respiratory Illness Clinic (RIC), established in Chelsea, MA, 4) samples 
from MGH Infection Control Unit investigations, and 5) samples drawn from the general pool of 
available samples tested by the MGH Microbiology Laboratory during the period from March 4 
through May 9, 2020. Archived samples obtained from MADPH included NP swabs from 1) all 
available samples representing the first two known travel-associated introductions and the 
Berkshire County cluster and 2) all available samples submitted to MADPH from Boston 
Healthcare for the Homeless Program (BHCHP) from Mar 19 through April 18, a period that 
included universal screening ​(​16​)​. 
Annotation of Cases 
Epidemiological data on exposure and geography were obtained from medical record review            
(MGH) or collected by the DPH laboratory in the process of clinical testing. Zip code and                
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county-level data were available for most samples from MGH. County-level data was available             
from DPH samples. Individuals who participated in the conference or who had known direct              
contact with attendees of the conference were deemed conference-associated (n = 28). One             
additional patient reported staying at the conference hotel but was diagnosed with COVID-19             
over 1 month later;their exposure was considered unlikely to be due to the conference.  
Viral sequencing 
Samples were received at the Broad Institute as viral transport medium, universal transport 
medium, or molecular transport medium from NP swabs. In accordance with institutional 
biosafety committee approvals, samples were inactivated with Buffer AVL (Qiagen) or other 
chaotropic salt solution prior to extraction. RNA was extracted from 200uL of transport medium 
using either the QiAmp Viral RNA Mini Kit (Qiagen), or the MagMAX mirVana Total RNA 
Isolation kit on a KingFisher Flex automated extraction instrument (Thermo Fisher Scientific). 
Residual DNA was removed from the extracted material using TURBO DNase (Thermo Fisher 
Scientific). 
 
Human ribosomal RNA was depleted using a ssDNA probe-based RNase H depletion method 
as previously described ​(​39​, ​40 ​)​, or with the Ribo-Zero Plus rRNA Depletion Kit (Illumina). 
Unique ERCC RNA spike-ins were added to each sample as a quality control measure to track 
and mitigate potential cross contamination or downstream sample preparation issues. First and 
second strand cDNA was synthesized using either SuperScript III or IV Reverse Transcriptase 
(Thermo Fisher Scientific), and sequencing libraries were prepared with the Nextera XT or 
TruSeq RNA Library Prep kits as previously described ​(​39​, ​40 ​)​. Libraries were sequenced using 
Illumina MiSeq, HiSeq, NextSeq, or NovaSeq machines with 100-nucleotide paired-end reads. 
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samples were extracted, prepared, and sequenced at the Broad Institute, Cambridge, MA, USA. 
The rRNA depletion, cDNA synthesis, and library construction protocols used in this study are 




Genomic data analysis 
We conducted all analyses using viral-ngs 2.0.21 on the Terra platform (​app.terra.bio ​). All of the 
workflows named below are publicly available via the Dockstore Tool Repository Service 
(​dockstore.org/organizations/BroadInstitute/collections/pgs​). We demultiplexed individual 
libraries using the ​demux_only​ workflow for each lane of each flowcell, removed reads mapping 
to the human genome and to other known technical contaminants (e.g. sequencing adapters) 
using ​deplete_only​ (with bwaDbs=[“gs://pathogen-public-dbs/v0/hg19.bwa_idx.tar.zst”] and 
blastDbs=[“gs://pathogen-public-dbs/v0/GRCh37.68_ncRNA.fasta.zst", 
“gs://pathogen-public-dbs/v0/hybsel_probe_adapters.fasta”]), and performed reference-based 
assembly using ​assemble_refbased​ (once per sample, with all sequencing replicates merged in 
the read_unmapped_bams input and with a reference_fasta taken from 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/nuccore/NC_045512.2?report=fasta ​). We ran ​assemble_refbased 
on 1970 read set inputs spanning 1535 distinct samples (inclusive of controls).  
 
We used the following stringent criteria to excluded any sample where i) fewer than 50,000 
cleaned reads were obtained; ii) the proportion of reads mapping to the internal control (IC) 
sequence (ERCC spike-in) was >3 standard deviations from the mean observed for that IC 
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sequence across all sequencing batches; iii) replicate genomes—where available—had 2 or 
more discordant SNPs or 1 or more discordant indels; iv) the number of normalized reads 
mapping to the SARS-CoV-2 genome was less than that observed in the highest negative 
control from the same sequencing batch. From the 1196 patient samples after filtering we 
obtained 850 assemblies with unambiguous consensus calls over at least 80% of the 
SARS-CoV-2 genome, and 778 with over unambiguous consensus calls over at least 98% of 
the SARS-CoV-2 genome, of which 772 were from unique individuals. We submitted 633 read 
sets to NCBI SRA and 837 genomes with at least 80% completeness to NCBI Genbank (using 
the ​genbank​ workflow). We used the 772 high-quality assemblies from unique individuals for the 
phylogenetic analyses described. 
 
Failure to produce a SARS-CoV-2 genome from a PCR-positive sample may have been due to 
low viral titer, RNA degradation due to lack of sufficient cold chain, or technical sample handling 
issues (e.g. improper swab technique). Samples which failed to produce a genome at the first 
attempt were not further investigated at this time. To confirm the quality of our assemblies and 
mitigate any potential contamination we performed replicate library preparation and sequencing 
from RNA for 10% of samples. Among those samples that assembled a complete genome in 
both replicates, consensus-level genomes were identical.  
 
Allele frequency was estimated as the proportion of derived / (derived + ancestral) versions of               
the allele. A 95% confidence interval was estimated for the proportion using the binomial              
distribution. The frequency of the iSNV for MA_MGH_00427 was calculated from 2 libraries; 50              
reads contained the derived T allele and 146 reads contained the ancestral G allele based on                
the aligned reads from the viral-ngs pipeline (as described above). 
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Phylogenetic tree reconstruction 
We constructed phylogenetic maximum likelihood (ML) and time trees with associated 
visualizations using the Augur pipeline (​augur_with_assemblies​). We used 
SARS-CoV-2-specific procedures taken from ​github.com/nextstrain/ncov​, specifically setting the 
clock rate to 0.0008 +/- 0.0004, rooting the tree using the reference genome, and using the 
nextstrain site-masking and clade-definition files. In addition to our 772 genomes from unique 
individuals from Massachusetts, we included a global comparison set of 4,011 genomes 
subsampled from a download from the GISAID database on 15 June, 2020. These 4,011 
genomes contain at most 50 representatives from each state or province in North America plus 
at most 50 representatives from each country outside of North America. Random subsampling 
was biased towards genomes genetically close to our focal set of genomes, using the distance 
matrix calculator at ​github.com/nextstrain/ncov/blob/master/scripts/priorities.py​. The resulting 
augur output is visualizable on ​auspice.us​ or can be incorporated in custom deployments using 
Google Cloud Run using our template (​github.com/dpark01/auspice-private-template ​); this 
template is used to showcase our data at ​auspice.broadinstitute.org ​. 
 
We also conducted additional analysis of the genomes sequenced in this study. We aligned the 
set of 772 genomes using MAFFT v7.471 ​(​41​)​ and trimmed 5’ and 3’ (first 265 and last 228 
bases) UTRs from the alignment in R ​(​42​)​. To estimate the root-to-tip distance, we constructed 
ML phylogenetic trees using PhyML ​(​43​)​ v3.3.20190909 with default parameters using the 
MAFFT alignment of 772 genomes. We used TempEst ​(​44​)​ v.1.5.3 and selected the best-fitting 
root as identified using a heuristic residual mean squared function. To estimate branch support 
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in maximum-likelihood phylogenies, we used IQ-Tree ​(​45​)​ with the ultrafast bootstrap and 
10,000 bootstrap samples. 
 
To construct Bayesian time-trees, we used BEAST 2.6.2 with a general time reversible 
substitution model with 4 rate categories drawn from a gamma distribution (GTR4G), a strict 
clock, coalescent exponential tree prior, a uniform [-inf, inf] prior for the clock rate, a 1/x [-inf, inf] 
prior for the coalescent effective population size; and a laplace [-inf, inf] prior for the growth rate. 
We ran the MCMC chain in BEAST2 for 100 million steps and thinned the chain by recording 
samples every 1000 steps. The first 30% of samples were discarded prior to calculating 
summary statistics from the posterior. We used TreeAnnotator v2.6.2 to construct maximum 
clade credibility trees with a burn-in percentage of 30%. We also compared a 
Hasegawa-Yoshino-Gawa substitution model with kappa = 2 and with 4 rate categories drawn 
from the gamma distribution (HKY4G) and ran this chain for 100 million steps using the same 
thinning and burn-in described for the GTR4G model.  
Detection of respiratory virus co-infection 
We used Kraken2 ​(​46​)​ to identify other viral taxa present in NP swab samples from COVID 
positive patients, excluding those removed by filters i and ii described above. To do so, we ran 





spikein_db=”gs://pathogen-public-dbs/v0/ERCC_96_nopolyA.fasta”). Our kraken2 database was 
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constructed on 5 May, 2020, with the ​kraken2_build​ workflow (with 
standard_libraries=[“archaea”, “bacteria”, “plasmid”, “viral”, “human”, “fungi”, “protozoa”, 
“UniVec_Core”] and 
custom_libraries=[“gs://pathogen-public-dbs/v1/Hybsel_Viruses-20170523.2.fa.zst”, 
“gs://pathogen-public-dbs/v1/ercc_spike-ins-20170523.fa”]). The resulting per-sample outputs 
were run through the ​merge_metagenomics​ workflow and the resulting hits were filtered down 
to 20 common respiratory viruses of interest (adenovirus, HCoV-229E, HCoV-HKU1, 
HCoV-NL63, betacoronavirus 1, parainfluenza 1, parainfluenza 2, parainfluenza 3, 
Parainfluenza 4, enterovirus A, enterovirus B, enterovirus C, enterovirus D, influenza A, 
influenza B, human metapneumovirus, respiratory syncytial virus, SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, 
human rhinovirus) using a threshold of 10 reads to identify a putative co-infection. We 
independently confirmed the presence of viral co-infections identified in the metagenomic 
sequencing data using the BioFire FilmAssay Respiratory Panel, performed at the MADPH or 
MGH Microbiology Laboratory. Three samples from early in the pandemic, for which no 
additional sample remained, were not tested.  
 
Identifying viral importation events 
For ancestral state inference, we inferred a state of “MA” vs “non-MA” using the augur 
pipeline ​(​47​)​. Cases whose ancestral state was inferred as non-MA with high confidence (>0.95) 
were considered imported cases. Conference-associated and nursing facility samples were 
excluded from the importation analysis.  
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Haplotype Network Reconstruction 
Haplotype networks were visualized using the software tool PopART v1.7 ​(​48​)​. The assembled 
sequences were aligned against NC_045512.2 and the first 268bp at the 5' end and 230bp at 
the 3' end (UTR regions) were removed from the alignment. A nexus-format input file for 
PopART was created using a Python script to consolidate sequence information with metadata 
classifications. This script is available at http://www.github.com/broadinstitute/[repository]. A 
TCS network of the sequences ​(​49​)​ was constructed in PopART. Regions where any sequence 
had ambiguous bases were masked. For the construction of haplotype networks in Figure 4, 
one sample, MA_MGH_00090, was removed to prevent masking of the G3892T variant. For the 
displayed haplotype networks, the area of the circle corresponds to how many 
verbatim-identical sequences (after masking) bin together as the same haplotype. The hash 
marks on the edges indicate the SNP distance between sequence haplotypes (1 mark=1 SNP 
apart). Gene graphs were constructed using pairwise distance matrices computed on aligned 
SARS-CoV-2 genomes and clustered using the R package adegenet ​(​50​)​.  
SNF genetic diversity analysis 
For this analysis, the main SNF cluster was restricted to samples collected before April 15, 
2020, and the conference cluster to samples collected before March 8, 2020. We assumed that 
the number of transmissions was the minimum possible (one fewer than the number of samples 
in the cluster). The p-value for the comparison between the clusters assessed the probability 
that the observed numbers of mutations were produced by Poisson processes with the same 
value of λ, using the R function poisson.test (in the ​stats​ package v3.6.2). For the expected 
number of mutations, we assumed that substitutions occur predominantly during the 
transmission bottleneck and calculated the expected rate based on a generation time of 5.0 
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days ​(​51​)​ and a mutation rate of 1.0 x 10 ​-3​/bp/year (Fig. S5C), which together yield an 
expectation of 0.41 substitutions/transmission. 
Epidemiological and demographic data analysis 
We downloaded publicly available daily and weekly data on cases of SARS-CoV-2 in MA for the 
period January 1 - August 1 from the website of the MADPH 
(​https://www.mass.gov/info-details/covid-19-response-reporting ​). This data included cases by 
day, cases by county over time, and cases involving congregate living facilities and staff. We 
compiled detailed case statistics by exposure category using the press releases reporting early 
case totals and exposure available on the MADPH website. During the study period, an 
additional case from February 6, 2020, was added to MADPH tallies. This case was missing 
detailed case information such as exposure category and was not included in early press 
releases from MADPH; it was therefore excluded from the tallies of cases by exposure category 
and estimates of the sampling proportion, but included in total case counts over time as 
reported in the main text to incorporate the most recent tallies. To calculate the cumulative 
proportion of alleles by county, conference-associated and SNF-associated individuals were 
removed and the cumulative allele frequency through the end of the study period was calculated 
for each of the four counties with the largest numbers of genomes (Suffolk, Middlesex, Essex, 
and Norfolk). To calculate the proportion of domestic and global sequences from the GISAID 
database, a multiple sequence alignment of 58,043 complete GISAID genomes was 
downloaded on July 14 2020 and the percentage of ancestral and derived alleles was extracted 
from the alignment and plotted by geographic category.  
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We used R ​(​42​)​, Bioconductor ​(​52​)​, ggplot2, tidyverse ​(​53​)​, and ggtree ​(​54​)​ to clean and plot 
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Fig S1. A. ​Counts of complete genomes reported in this study, by county. ​B. ​Case counts by 
county reported by MADPH through July 1, 2020. ​C. ​Scatterplot of counts of complete genomes 
in this study vs. MADPH-reported cases through July 1, 2020.​ D. ​Sampling proportion by county 
(fraction of complete genomes sequenced in this study out of total cases by county reported to 
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Fig S2. A. ​ Mean coverage (on a log scale) vs. viral C​t​ for all samples included in the study. A 
linear regression fit is shown in blue. ​B.​ Fraction of the genome that is complete is shown vs. 
viral C​t​. A C​t​ < 28 was strongly associated with recovery of a complete virus genome. Fit from a 
logistic regression model is shown in blue. ​C.​ The numbers of genomes at given thresholds of 
completeness are displayed. ​D.​ Histogram of the numbers of genomes at different thresholds of 
completeness. ​E. ​Combined coverage across sequenced SARS-CoV-2 genomes. [​next page] 
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Fig S3. A. ​Scatterplot of MGH Roche cobas 6800 instrument PCR Ct values for SARS-CoV-2 
target vs. quantification prior to library construction. ​B. ​Scatterplot of MGH Roche cobas 6800 
instrument PCR C​t​ values for Pan SARS target vs. quantification prior to library construction. ​C. 
Scatterplot of Roche cobas 6800 PCR C​t​ targets. ​D ​. Scatterplot of DPH N1 assay vs. 
quantification prior to library construction. ​E​. Scatterplot of DPH N2 assay vs. quantification prior 
to library construction. ​F.​ Scatterplot of DPH N1 vs. N2 targets. ​G. ​ Scatterplot of MGH Roche 
cobas 6800 instrument PCR C​t​ values for SARS-CoV-2 target vs. mean coverage (log 10 scale). 
H. ​Scatterplot of MGH Roche cobas 6800 instrument PCR C​t​ values for Pan SARS target vs. 
mean coverage (log 10 scale). ​I. ​Quantification prior to sequencing vs. mean coverage (log 10 
scale) for MGH samples. ​J.​ Scatterplot of DPH N1 assay vs. mean coverage (log 10 scale). ​K. 
Scatterplot of DPH N2 assay vs. mean coverage (log 10 scale). ​L.​ Quantification prior to 
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Fig S4. A. ​Distance matrix of pairwise distances for all complete genomes (>98% complete) 
from unique individuals in this study. ​B.​ Histogram of pairwise distances for all possible pairwise 
comparisons between complete genomes in the study. ​C. ​Tajimas’s D values in 500-base-pair 
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Fig S5. A. ​Linear regression of root-to-tip distance vs. date of sampling. Root-to-tip distance 
was calculated using TempEst ​(​44​)​ on maximum likelihood trees inferred using PhyML ​(​43​)​.  
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Fig S6. ​Probability of an importation event over time. Samples whose ancestral state was 
inferred as non-MA are coded as 1 and samples whose ancestral state is inferred as MA are 
coded as 0 (a small amount of noise is added to the y-coordinate to show the density of the 
data). A logistic regression (red curve) shows the probability of importation decreasing through 
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Fig S7. ​Portion of global time-stamped phylogeny (inferred using augur​(​47​)​ with GISAID and 
MA genomes) containing MA-1 (red arrow).  
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Fig S8. ​Portion of the global time-scaled phylogenetic tree (inferred using augur​(​47​)​ with 
GISAID and MA genomes) containing DPH_00002 and DPH_00003 (marked with red arrows). 
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Fig S9 ​. Phylogenetic ML tree of MA samples from this study plus partial genomes (>5kb) from 
Berkshire County Cluster. Ultrafast bootstrap support (when > 80) is shown at nodes. Tips 
corresponding to samples collected from the Berkshire County cluster are shown in orange.  
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Fig S10. ​Phylogenetic position of DPH_00011 (type genome for the Western MA cluster, 
sample labeled with red arrow).  
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Fig S11. ​ML Tree of MA genomes computed using IQtree, with ultrafast bootstrap support 




 . CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)
The copyright holder for this preprint this version posted August 25, 2020. .https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.08.23.20178236doi: medRxiv preprint 
 
Fig S12. A. Divergence tree of the C2416T variant showing all global sequences (in GISAID               
through June 14, 2020) with the C2416T variant. ​B. Map showing the distribution of the C2416T                
variant across the United States. Circle size reflects the number of reported genomes per state.               
C. Phylogeny (left panel) and map showing global distribution of C2416T/G8371T. ​D. Phylogeny             
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Fig S13. ​ML with samples from MGH suspected nosocomial clusters labeled. Posterior support             
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Fig S14. ​Sequenced samples labeled by zip code of residence for the top three zip codes in the                  
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Fig S15. ​Geographic distribution of select lineage-defining variants in Eastern Massachusetts.           
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Fig S16. ​Prevalence of conference-associated variants by day among the Chelsea Respiratory            
Illness Clinic (RIC), among individuals experiencing homelessness sampled by BHCHP, and           
among samples available from the MGH Microbiology Laboratory that were not a part of known               
clusters (Conference, SNF) or from the Chelsea RIC. The solid line gives the cumulative allele               
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Fig S17. A. Cumulative case numbers by exposure group from March 9 through March 12               
(period of data availability for the given exposures). ​B. ​Cumulative allele frequency of             
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Fig S18. ​Confirmation of respiratory virus detection in metagenomic sequencing results. ​A.            
Results of the BioFire FilmArray Respiratory Virus Panel performed on the 17 available samples              
for which co-infections were detected by metagenomic sequencing. ​B. Concordance between           
BioFire and metagenomic sequencing results for respiratory viruses.  
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Table S1. 
Download of sample_set table with summary assembly variables. 
Table S3 ​:  
Table of geographic ancestral trait inferences. 
Table S3. 
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